基于主从博弈的售电商电能量合同履约风险柔性处置技术

谢敬东 , 杨珉 , 姜豪坤 , 房广义

南方电网技术 ›› 2026, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (7) : 133 -142.

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南方电网技术 ›› 2026, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (7) : 133 -142. DOI: 10.13648/j.cnki.issn1674-0629.2026.07.013

基于主从博弈的售电商电能量合同履约风险柔性处置技术

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Flexible Disposal Technology for Performance Risks of Power Energy Contracts of Electricity Retailers Based on Master-Slave Game

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摘要

随着电力市场履约风险问题逐渐凸显,如何对售电商电能量合同违约实施合适的处置手段,成为运营监管机构管理与推进电力市场健康发展的研究重点。为此结合售电商违约金额不一的特点,为运营监管机构设计柔性处置技术,搭建运营监管机构和售电商之间的主从博弈架构。分析运营监管机构在售电商不同违约金额和面对不同成本的处置手段时如何选择合适的处置策略和售电商在不同处置策略下的应对行为。通过模拟现货市场价格波动,探讨主方不同力度的处置策略与从方履约行为之间的关系,并为主方提出最优处置策略。算例表明,柔性处置技术可有效管控售电商的履约行为和处置成本。

Abstract

As the issue of contract performance risk in the electricity market gradually becomes more prominent, how to implement appropriate measures to handle the contract breaches of electricity retailers has become a key focus of research for regulatory agencies to manage and promote the healthy development of the electricity market. In response, this paper designs a flexible disposal technology tailored for regulatory agencies, considering the varying degrees of penalty amount by electricity retailers, and establishes a leader-follower game framework between the regulatory agency and the electricity retailers. The study analyzes how the regulatory agency selects appropriate disposal strategies based on different breach amounts from electricity retailers and disposal costs, as well as how electricity retailers respond under different disposal strategies. By simulating price fluctuations in the spot market, the relationship between the leader's varying intensity of disposal strategies and the follower's performance behavior is explored, and optimal disposal strategies are proposed for the leader. Case studies show that the flexible disposal technology can effectively control both the performance behavior of electricity retailers and the disposal costs.

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关键词

主从博弈 / 售电商 / 履约行为 / 处置策略 / 柔性处置技术

Key words

master-slave game / electricity retailers / performance behavior / disposal strategy / flexible disposal technology

Author summay

谢敬东 (1968),男,研究生导师,博士,研究方向为电力市场建设及其监管、智能微电网和配电网安全分析,;

杨珉(1999),男,硕士研究生,研究方向为电力市场履约风险管控,;

姜豪坤(1997),男,硕士研究生,研究方向为智能微电网和配电网安全分析,。

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谢敬东,杨珉,姜豪坤,房广义. 基于主从博弈的售电商电能量合同履约风险柔性处置技术[J]. 南方电网技术, 2026, 20(7): 133-142 DOI:10.13648/j.cnki.issn1674-0629.2026.07.013

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基金资助

国家自然科学基金资助项目(51507099)

中国南方电网有限责任公司科技项目(GDKJXM20210110)

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