Flexible Disposal Technology for Performance Risks of Power Energy Contracts of Electricity Retailers Based on Master-Slave Game

Jingdong XIE , Min YANG , Haokun JIANG , Guangyi FANG

›› 2026, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (7) : 133 -142.

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›› 2026, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (7) : 133 -142. DOI: 10.13648/j.cnki.issn1674-0629.2026.07.013
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Flexible Disposal Technology for Performance Risks of Power Energy Contracts of Electricity Retailers Based on Master-Slave Game

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Abstract

As the issue of contract performance risk in the electricity market gradually becomes more prominent, how to implement appropriate measures to handle the contract breaches of electricity retailers has become a key focus of research for regulatory agencies to manage and promote the healthy development of the electricity market. In response, this paper designs a flexible disposal technology tailored for regulatory agencies, considering the varying degrees of penalty amount by electricity retailers, and establishes a leader-follower game framework between the regulatory agency and the electricity retailers. The study analyzes how the regulatory agency selects appropriate disposal strategies based on different breach amounts from electricity retailers and disposal costs, as well as how electricity retailers respond under different disposal strategies. By simulating price fluctuations in the spot market, the relationship between the leader's varying intensity of disposal strategies and the follower's performance behavior is explored, and optimal disposal strategies are proposed for the leader. Case studies show that the flexible disposal technology can effectively control both the performance behavior of electricity retailers and the disposal costs.

Keywords

master-slave game / electricity retailers / performance behavior / disposal strategy / flexible disposal technology

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Jingdong XIE,Min YANG,Haokun JIANG,Guangyi FANG. Flexible Disposal Technology for Performance Risks of Power Energy Contracts of Electricity Retailers Based on Master-Slave Game. 2026, 20(7): 133-142 DOI:10.13648/j.cnki.issn1674-0629.2026.07.013

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the National and Natural Scientific Foundation of China(51507099)

the Science and Research Project of China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd(GDKJXM20210110)

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